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NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS AND A LAWYER'S 
DUTY: REMARKS TO THE SENIOR JUDGE ADVOCATE 
SYMPOSIUM 
April 23, 2002 
JUDGE JAMES E. BAKER1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 
Introduction 
One of my favorite judicial comments, in one of my favorite cases, is 
Justice Frankfurter's comment about government in Youngstown.2 This is 
what he wrote: 
Before the cares of the White House were his own, President 
Harding is reported to have said that government after all is a 
very simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a fleet-
ing inhabitant of fairyland. The opposite is true. A constitu-
tional democracy like ours is perhaps the most difficult of man's 
social arrangements to manage successfully. 
When I was asked to speak to you about national security process, I 
immediately thought of Fairyland, or more precisely I thought of Justice 
Frankfurter's comment as a place to start. First, it captures the plain truth, 
already known to this audience, that good government is difficult work. 
1. Judge Bakerhas been a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces since September 2000. He previously served as Special Assistant to the President 
and Legal Adviser (1997-2000) as well as Deputy Legal Adviser (1994-1997) to the 
National Security Council (NSC). Judge Baker has also served as Counsel to the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board, as an attor-
ney adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, as a legislative aide and 
acting Chief of Staff to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and as a Marine Corps infantry 
officer. He is the author, with Michael Reisman, of Regulating Covert Action (Yale Uni-
versity Press: 1992). Judge Baker was born in New Haven, Connecticut, and raised in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is a graduate of Yale College (1982) and Yale Law School 
(1990), where he is currently a visiting lecturer. Judge Baker is married to Lori Neal Baker 
of Springfield, Virginia. They live with their daughter, Jamie, and son, Grant, in Virginia. 
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952). 
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This was true in 1952, and it is certainly true today, at a time when some 
look back to the 1950s as a time of danger, but relative simplicity. 
September 11 changed so much about our lives and how we perceive 
national security. Harold Lasswell, in an earlier context, described the 
sharing of danger throughout society as the "socialization of danger,"3 
which he wrote was a permanent characteristic of modern violence; but not 
for America until September 11. The socialization of danger has made 
ordinary citizens participants in the national security process in a way not 
previously experienced. In addition, it has brought relatively unknown 
federal agencies, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 
Centers for Disease Control, to the forefront of national security planning 
and response. And both of these occurrences have emphasized the impor-
tance of viewing terrorism and cyber security as problems requiring eff ec-
tive vertical and not just horizontal process. 
Where most national security problems require coordination amongst 
federal agencies, homeland security is equally about coordination between 
federal, state, and local actors down to the level of first responder and the 
technician who spots the first medical anomaly. This vertical process will 
test the manner in which information is shared, resources allocated, and 
perhaps the level at which decisions of life and death, heretofore made by 
the President, are taken. 
Second, Justice Frankfurter's comment suggests that government is 
particularly complex in a constitutional democracy. Frankfurter had in 
mind the interplay between constitutional branches. But constitutional 
democracy also means that all decisions are made according to law. And 
that means that sound Executive process must incorporate timely and com-
petent legal advice. In some cases, legal review is dictated by statute, as 
in the case of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA);' which 
requires the attorney general, or his designee, to approve requests for elec-
tronic surveillance or physical search before they are submitted to the 
FISA court In other cases, the President has directed a specific process to 
ensure legal review in areas historically prone to peril, including certain 
intelligence activities. However, the majority of legal advice within the 
national security process is not directed, but is the product of practice, cus-
tom, and personal interchange between lawyer and client. That means that 
good process requires personal persuasion, presence, and value added, or 
3. Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison Stare, 46 AM. J. Soc. 459 (Jan. 1941). 
4. Pub. L. No. 95-511 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (2000)). 
126 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol.173 
the lawyer will find he or she is only contributing to decisions where legal 
review is mandated and then only as the last stop on the bus route. Consti-
tutional democracy does not rest on such process. 
Third, because I was asked to comment on the Kosovo air campaign 
as illustration, Justice Frankfurter's comment is also interesting in that it 
notes some skepticism as to whether President Harding actually said what 
he is understood to have said. After serving at the National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) for seven years, I am not surprised at how often misperceptions 
emerge and how long they linger. With Kosovo, there remains a misper-
ception that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, insisted upon approv-
ing all air targets. The reality was far different. Of the approximately ten 
thousand strike sorties against some two thousand targets during the cam-
paign, the national security advisor and I reviewed two or three hundred 
individual targets, of which the president examined a subset. The Presi-
dent's review of targets was crisp; he would hear the descriptions, review 
the briefing materials, and at times raise questions. He expected issues to 
have been addressed before they reached him and that any still requiring 
resolution-perhaps those involving an ally-be quickly and clearly pre-
sented. This was not a ponderous process, but the kind of decision-making 
that one might expect, and that I expected, of a commander-in-chief. What 
made the process complicated, and sometimes dysfunctional, was not the 
U.S. chain of command, but the idiosyncrasies of a Northern Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign within a framework of consensus 
decision-making involving nineteen democracies. 
Now, while some of my NSC staff colleagues might put their version 
of a process talk on a single, yellow sticky, my version comes in an ency-
clopedic set. But you can thank Colonel [Richard] Rosen5 that you are not 
getting that edition. I accept my temporal limitation in trying to describe 
a process, which depending on how you define national security, might 
include all aspects of our national life. Therefore, I intend to make a few 
comments about my prior role at the NSC, not out of any desire to tell my 
story to an audience too familiar with real war stories. Rather, I want to 
give you the context from which I draw three enduring duties of the 
5. Colonel Richard D. Rosen is currently the Commandant of the U.S. Army Judge 
Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
2002] REMARKS SENIOR JUDGE ADVOCATE SYMPOSIUM 127 
national security lawyer: to uphold process, to educate, and to support and 
defend the Constitution. 
My hope is that I will prompt you to think about what you do, how 
you do it, and how your work relates to the bigger picture of constitutional 
government, which after all is not "a very simple thing." 
A. The Role of the Lawyer 
Each President, agency head, and commander will adopt his or her 
own approach to legal advice, ranging from avoidance to active engage-
ment. As a result, the manner in which lawyers provide their advice and 
at what stage of the process will vary; however, at the national level the 
essential participants will remain the same: the Attorney General, the 
Office of Legal Counsel, agency general counsel, and in areas of concern 
to us, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)/Legal, and the President's national 
security lawyers. 
Traditionally, lawyers for the President have included the Counsel to 
the President and the NSC Legal Adviser. Practice has varied as to the rel-
ative role and weight of each and the extent to which other White House 
lawyers, such as the Deputy White House Counsel, are involved in 
national security decision-making, if at all. During my tour, the Legal 
Adviser reported to the National Security Adviser, and operated indepen-
dent from, but in appropriate coordination with, the Counsel to the Presi-
dent, th~ President's senior legal adviser. 
As NSC Legal Adviser, I performed three basic functions. First, I 
provided independent advice to the President, National Security Adviser, 
and NSC staff on all matters coming to the NSC or going to the President. 
Second, I served in effect as general counsel, reviewing personnel actions, 
responding to discovery requests, and administering the NSC's ethics pro-
gram. I might note here that this program included application of the 
Hatch Act6 prohibitions on partisan political activities by NSC staff. 
National security law is not all constitutional questions about use of force, 
but rather a relentless opportunity to apply principles of triage. One must 
appreciate that there is a difference between the "urgent" ethics question 
6. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2000). 
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about receipt of a gift and the urgent operational law question, unless the 
question comes from the President or National Security Advisor. 
Finally, I coordinated the interagency legal process, ensuring that 
presidential decisions had appropriate interagency legal review and that 
the Principals and Deputies Committees had timely legal input. Where 
necessary, this was accomplished by generating interagency legal papers 
as background or by attending Principals and Deputies meetings to spot 
issues and answer questions, always with a view to honestly conveying 
agency positions of law, while at the same time ensuring that those posi-
tions were generated and tested on the President's timetable for decision. 
I learned early that if you wanted to know if the Defense Department 
(DOD) had authority to do something, to ask the State Department and vice 
versa. 
The role of the Legal Adviser in this latter function has varied from 
administration to administration, depending on, among other factors, the 
personality of participants and the extent to which the office is perceived 
by agencies as facilitating national security process, as John Norton Moore 
has argued for a long time, or as a source of potential rival legal advice. I 
am squarely in the camp that sees the office as an important avenue by 
which agency counsel can provide meaningful input into presidential deci-
sion-making. In my view, NSC/Legal is the interagency legal commu-
nity's best opportunity to have "eyes on" the presidential memo or 
meaningful input into a Principals or Deputies Committee meeting, 
because this is the office most likely to see all the paper flowing to the 
President and all the meeting agendas. It also has the focus and mission 
to staff problems from the ground up rather than in finished form. But 
whether these tasks are performed by NSC/Legal or elsewhere, it is essen-
tial that they be performed within the Executive Office of the President. 
The essential skill of the national security lawyer at the NSC is the 
ability to spot issues, generate timely advice through consultation with the 
appropriate experts, and succinctly convey results to senior policy-makers 
without losing nuance. How to balance the inherent tension between sub-
stantive input and speed in each context is the art of performance. Know-
ing above all else how much you don't know is a keystone to success. 
As an illustration of this process, during Kosovo, I attended Deputies 
and Principals meetings, often one or two a day. Afterwards, I would fol-
low up with analysis alerting the National Security Advisor in more detail 
to legal rocks and shoals ahead. I would also ensure that agency general 
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counsel were aware of the issues raised relevant to their principals. On tar-
gets coming to the President for review, my critical process link was with 
the legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mike Lohr, who 
worked in concert with the DOD general counsel. Having determined the 
process I thought would work best, I made sure that the National Security 
Advisor and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs agreed, which ensured the 
full backing of the chain of command. 
As the national-level military lawyer closest to the operational line, 
Admiral Lohr served as my primary contact, through whom I could track 
and review target briefs as they came to the White House from the CJCS 
and Secretary of Defense. This communications channel kept me ahead 
of, or at least even with, the operational time line, and ensured that the 
President, and not just the Pentagon, had the benefit of military and DOD 
legal expertise. It also provided for a single chain of legal communication, 
thereby avoiding confusion. Working together on hundreds of targets, we 
came to understand each other's vocabulary, tone, and expressions. 
I should also point out that my earlier exposure in 1994 to Mike Lohr 
and Rick Rosen contributed to my judgment that a Judge Advocate should 
always serve in the NSC legal office. My experience was that judge advo-
cates are terrific generalists, who are as willing to work outside their exper-
tise as they are within it Moreover, there was no need to explain to a judge 
advocate general (JAG) that work came first, every day, seven days a 
week. Judge advocates general understood the importance of being 
present when the question is asked. Decision-makers at the NSC were pre-
pared to engage the lawyer, so long as the response was immediate. The 
JAGs I worked with also readily understood the importance of leaving ego 
at the door when coordinating (and sometimes coaxing out) agency views. 
At the same time, I found that military lawyers, particularly those outside 
of Washington, initially needed coaching on how to engage the bureau-
cracy both within the White House and through the interagency process. 
Where was the appropriate point of entry? Who could speak for an 
agency's legal view and when were they doing so? I sensed that the hard-
est adjustment was learning how much nuance to provide with advice and 
in what manner to provide it. 
In my own case, I came to realize that perhaps my most relevant legal 
training had been as a Marine Corps infantry officer. Infantry officers, 
like other military officers, have many opportunities to make rapid deci-
sions with incomplete information, and then be held accountable for those 
decisions. So, while there are lots of extremely bright lawyers, not all law-
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yers are capable of making a decision on operational timelines. The 
Marine Corps also gives one the opportunity to practice endurance, an 
essential trait when the legal advice rendered at midnight must be as fresh 
and solid as that offered at 0800 in the morning. 
B. Duties of the National Security Lawyer 
It is axiomatic that the national security lawyer's duty is to guide deci-
sion-makers toward legally available options. In performing this function 
in a timely and meaningful manner, the lawyer provides for our physical 
security. In doing it faithfully, based on honest belief on the application of 
law, they provide for the security of our way of life, which is founded on 
the rule of law. The daily grind of national security legal advice, however, 
should not overshadow three additional and enduring responsibilities of 
the lawyer. 
C. Process 
Lawyers are not always readily accepted into the decision-making 
room. This reluctance reflects concerns about secrecy, delay, and "lawyer 
creep" (the legal version of "mission creep," whereby one legal question 
becomes seventeen, requiring not one lawyer but forty-three to answer). 
Of course, decision-makers may also fear that the lawyer may flatly say 
''no" to something the policy maker wants to do. 
Nonetheless, lawyers are indispensable to good process and should 
feel a duty to uphold good process and participate in decision-making. In 
any given context, the pressure of the moment may encourage short-term 
thinking and the adoption of process shortcuts. The lawyer alone may be 
sufficiently detached from the policy outcome to identify the enduring 
institutional consequences of a particular course of action. So too, the law-
yer alone may be familiar, and may feel an obligation to be familiar, with 
applicable written procedures. Process is substance if it means critical 
actors and perspectives are omitted from the discussion table. 
In my experience, good process results in better decisions. As I noted, 
it ensures that the correct actors are in the room, with the best information 
as is available at that time. It avoids oversights. In a constitutional democ-
racy, it also helps to ensure that decisions are made in accordance with law 
and by those actors the people elected to make those national secllrity deci-
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sions most important to our well being. Good process also establishes 
accountability, which in turn improves result. 
Second, process is not antithetical to timely decisions, operational 
timelines, or to secrecy. Process must find the right balance between speed 
and strength, secrecy, and input. But process can always meet deadlines. 
There is no excuse for shortcuts. Process can be made to work faster and 
smarter. By example, if legal review is warranted, the attorney general 
alone can review a matter and, if need be, do so while sitting next to the 
President in the Oval Office. The problem some policy-makers have with 
process is not the time it takes for good process, but the prospect of dis-
agreement, and that can take real time to resolve. 
Third, process should be contextual. The legal and policy parameters 
for responding to terrorism are different than those for responding to a Bal-
kan crisis. Clandestine and remote military operations against a hidden 
enemy will dictate different decision processes than NATO air operations 
against fixed targets, as will the different political and policy parameters of 
both situations. One has to maintain situational awareness to find the mea-
sure of process and approval that ensures law is applied in a manner that is 
faithful to constitutional, statutory, and executive dictates, and that meets 
operational timelines. Therefore, there will always be some tension as to 
whom should see what when. But, if there is no right way to lawyer, there 
is a "worst way," which is to exclude lawyers from the process or for the 
lawyer to wait to be asked. 
Finally, good process is also dependent on culture, personality, and 
style. The President can direct legal review of his decisions, but if a 
National Security Adviser is not committed to such a review, it will not 
occur in a meaningful manner, if at all. In short, it is not just the presence 
of a Legal Advisor at the NSC that will prevent an Iran/Contra, it is the 
presence of an [Assistant to the President for] NSA who insists on legal 
input in the decision-making process. And, where there is a seam in the 
process, the lawyer must identify it. 
I was fortunate to work for national security advisors and with Chair-
men of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of Defense that understood 
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this. In Mr. [Samuel R.] Berger's7 words, my duty was to ensure that in 
doing the right thing, the United States was doing it in the right way. 
D. Educate 
National security lawyers also have a duty to educate. Absent 
groundwork, the policy-maker may respond at the moment of crisis by see-
ing the law only as something that allows or does not allow the policy-
maker to do what he wants. Contextual advice built on a foundation 
already laid will be more readily absorbed and accepted. Policy-makers 
will internalize the parameters of the law and better understand why the 
law applies the way it does. A three a.m. conference call is no time to 
explain for the first time the overriding principles of proportionality, 
necessity, and discrimination in targeting. Nor will all policy makers 
immediately understand the sometime incongruous application of the law 
of armed conflict (LOAC) without some background on the Geneva Con-
ventions and their overriding commitment to a legal and moral imperative 
of ensuring that force is used in the most humane and economical manner 
possible. Therefore, I made a point of educating on the law of armed con-
flict before (as well as during and after) the air campaign. 
Advance guidance on the law of armed conflict also helps establish 
lines of communication and a common vocabulary of nuance between law-
yer and client before the crisis. In a larger, more layered bureaucracy than 
the President's national security staff, where the lawyer may be less prox-
imate to the decision-maker at time of crisis, I imagine that the teaching 
process is even more important. Any policy maker who hears a good 
LOAC brief will be sure his or her lawyer fully participates in the targeting 
process. In addition, the policy maker will understand in a live situation 
that the lawyer is applying "hard law"-specific, well established, and 
sanctioned-and not kibitzing on operational matters. 
I say that in part because I found that some policy makers treat inter-
national law as "soft law," and domestic, particularly criminal, law as 
"hard law." The law of armed conflict is, of course, both. Under 18 U.S. 
Code § 2441, specified war crimes committed by or against Americans 
violate U.S. criminal law. Moreover, whether we like it or not, the law of 
7. Mr. Berger was the National Security Advisor during the Clinton Administration 
from 1997- 2001. 
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armed conflict will continue to serve as one international measure by 
which the United States is judged. 
Today, an understanding of the legal framework of homeland security 
is as important as understanding the law of armed conflict. And like that 
law, issues involving posse comitatus are hard to explain in a ''yes" or "no" 
sentence at three in the morning. 
E. Constitution 
Most importantly, lawyers must be advocates for the Constitution and 
not just for their clients. National security lawyers have a responsibility to 
teach, explain, and apply the Constitution, and turn it over to the next 
watch in as strong a position as they found it 
There are hard questions ahead in a time of homeland insecurity from 
which lawyers should not shy. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 8: 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of 
national conduct. . . . The violent destruction of life and property 
incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a 
state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached 
to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which 
have a tendency to destroy their civilian and political rights. To 
be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of 
being less free. 8 
It is the national security lawyer's task to alert policymakers to this tension. 
To show both sides of every coin. As Justice Jackson observed of his own 
government service in Youngstown, ''the tendency is strong to emphasize 
transient results upon policies and lose sight of enduring consequences 
upon the balanced structure of our Republic. "9 This means not only advis-
ing the client on what legally can be done, but also on the institutional con-
sequences of taking those actions. 
This is hardest to do when lives are at stake. But, the Constitution was 
not designed to fail, to safeguard our security at the expense of our free-
dom, or celebrate freedom at the expense of security. It is designed to 
8. THE FEDERAUST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952). 
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underpin and protect us and our way of life. National security lawyers 
must let it do both. 
It talces moral courage to participate fully and objectively as a lawyer: 
to say "yes," to say "no," and more often, something in between that 
guides. But, you cannot have law without courage. We may be a govern-
ment of laws, but "laws are made by men, interpreted by men, and 
enforced by men, and in the continuous process, which we call govern-
ment, there is continuous opportunity for the human will to assert itself." 10 
Therefore, law depends on the morality of those who apply it. It depends 
on the moral courage of lawyers like you, who will raise tough questions, 
who dare to argue both sides of every issue, and who will insist upon being 
heard at the highest levels of decision-making, and ultimately, call the 
legal questions as they believe the Constitution dictates and not necessarily 
as we may want at a moment in time. 
This duty should have particular resonance with military and govern-
ment lawyers who have sworn to "support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States ... , [and to] bear true faith and allegiance to the same." 11 
In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson was asked to speak to the grad-
uating Naval Academy class on the eve of United States entry into World 
War I. Remarkably, he arrived without a prepared speech, which adds to 
the beauty and sincerity of his words. This is how he closed. 
I congratulate you that you are going to live your lives under the 
most stimulating compulsion that any man can feel, the sense, 
not of private duty merely, but of public duty also. And then if 
you perform that duty, there is a reward awaiting you which is 
superior to any other reward in the world. That is the affection-
ate remembrance of your fellow men-their honor, their affec-
tion.12 
I can think of no more important time to be a lawyer, and in particular, 
a national security lawyer, like you. Every day you come to work, you pro-
vide for our physical security by clearly and quickly advising the decision-
maker. And, you help to secure our way of life by upholding the rule of 
10. A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, THE BASIS OF A RULE OF LAw, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND TIIB 
DEMOCRATIC IDEAL (Yale University Press 1959). 
11. U.S. Dep't of Army, Form 71, Oath of Office-Military Personnel (July 1999). 
12. Woodrow Wilson, Address to Naval Academy Graduating Class (1916), 
reprinted in LEND ME YouR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY (William Satire ed., 1997). 
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law with good process, spotting the enduring consequences of what we do, 
and facing squarely the sometime tension between security and liberty 
raised in FederaUst Number 8. The national security lawyers who are true 
to this duty should never doubt their role or their worth, and while they 
may not always garner affection, they will always have the honor of having 
borne true faith and allegiance to the Constitution. There is no higher call-
ing. 
